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The Marren and Page Case List Finley v Finley
Learn more about The Marren and Page Case List Finley v Finley.
Interpretation of Court RulesThe bottom line to these cases is that it is incumbent upon the attorneys, especially the attorney for the spouse, to anticipate post-divorce status changes and build that anticipation into the decree. SUP> At a later hearing, Mr. Pyne was pressed for what he meant, and he responded that "the purpose of the legislation is to reemphasize to the courts that before the retirement system will comply with a court order with respect to dividing a [member’s] benefits with his or her divorced spouse, the court order shall comply with the provisions and terms of the retirement act."2 He further specified that the "purpose of the legislation is to protect the system and members of the system from these types of orders which fall outside the scope of the act."3 In Schwartz v. Schwartz, 126 Nev. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Opn. No. 8, Mar. 4, 2010), the Nevada Supreme Court determined that when a potential alimony obligor is old, rich, and sick, courts must explicitly determine whether lump sum alimony is appropriate. If the former spouse dies first, then the member automatically gets back the entirety of the monthly spousal share, for the rest of his life. There are nine basic possibilities, however, as to what the spouse should receive in the event that the member dies first. Each carries with it a different weighing of equities, rights, and responsibilities.1 At the time of the marriage, the husband had a half-interest in a lawn business. Seven years after marriage, the lawn-care segment was sold (and the wife signed as a seller), and the business name was changed to show it was a nursery. The district court refused to recharacterize the business as community. The Supreme Court found the wife’s argument that the business change terminated the earlier business, rendering the business upon divorce community property, "unpersuasive." The Court held that transmutation required a showing by clear and convincing evidence. While the wife signed a "stock transfer restriction," no shares were ever issued to her. The husband testified that he never intended to make a gift to the wife of any interest in the property. The Supreme Court held that "the appearance of [wife’s] signature as a shareholder on certain documents, without more, is not clear and convincing evidence of transmutation." Id. at 858. In light of the continuing evolution of bankruptcy law, it has generally become easier for spouses to prevent discharge of arrearages in military retirement benefits, as well as saving further payments, even if the property division is treated as a property division. Contrary to belief in some circles, the SCRA does affect divorce, custody, and paternity cases, but it only applies if the opposing party is on active duty.2 If the member is on active duty, but has not made an appearance, the court maystay the proceedings for at least 90 days on application of counsel or the court’s own motion - ifthe court determines that there might be a defense which cannot be presented in the absence of the member, or if the member has not been contacted and it can’t be determine if a meritorious defense exists.3 SUP> Case law from the time period where the husband was the manager of the community property held that the managing spouse must keep the community and separate property segregated.6 If community and separate property becomes intermingled, it is the managing spouse’s burden to prove the separate nature of the property so claimed.7 Absent such proof, the entire property will be presumed to be community.8 A place eligible to be the "home state" is a state within the United States, the District of Columbia, or extensions of our country.5 The UCCJEA also has an international application, as it includes foreign countries as if they were states within the United States, unless the child custody laws of that country violate fundamental principles of human rights.6 Japan is not recognized as such a place, and Japan therefore can, and should be, included within the scope of Nevada¡¯s UCCJEA. Both Nevada and Japan are therefore eligible to be the "home state." The bottom line to these cases is that it is incumbent upon the attorneys, especially the attorney for the spouse, to anticipate post-divorce status changes and build that anticipation into the decree. The second problem arises when it is necessary to determine whether the State with continuing jurisdiction has relinquished it. There should be a clear basis to determine when that court has relinquished jurisdiction. The UCCJA provided no guidance on this issue. The ambiguity regarding whether a court has declined jurisdiction can result in one court improperly exercising jurisdiction because it erroneously believes that the other court has declined jurisdiction. This caused simultaneous proceedings and conflicting custody orders. In addition, some courts have declined jurisdiction after only informal contact between courts with no opportunity for the parties to be heard. This raised significant due process concerns. The UCCJEA addresses these issues in Sections 110, 202, and 206. But the converse is not true. Nevada courts have personal jurisdiction over Nevada residents, and when such a resident’s filings give rise to a legitimate claim for fees in favor of the out-of-State party, such fees may be awarded. All such plans prohibit the plan from paying anything to a former spouse until actual retirement. And in all such pension plans, orders requiring the payment to a former spouse upon eligibility of the employee to retire requires the worker to pay the former spouse directly, out of pocket, until actual retirement and payments from the retirement plan begin. The same day, the Court issued a decision in Olvera v. Olvera (No. 38233, Oct. 29, 2003), by way of an unpublished Order of Remand. This is unfortunate, because Olvera was a more common factual situation than was Shelton, and therefore would have been more useful as precedent. The divorce decree required payments to the former spouse, who received them for many years until the member elected to receive disability benefits, 25 years post-divorce, eliminating the spousal share. Reversing the district court, the Court ordered the member to make up all sums that his election caused to be diverted from the former spouse to him. Whether you are in need of a pre-nup, post-nup, separation papers, spousal support documents, divorce decrees or any other Las Vegas family law jurisdiction issues, let our family law experts help you. PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: TimesNewRoman"> Thus, the existing deviation factor of "amount of time the child spend with each parent" can be a factor for either increasing guideline support (when presumed direct expenditures on the child are less than normal) or decreasing guideline support (when presumed direct expenditures on the child are more than normal). The original "Rivero Formula," however, is a blunt instrument that takes a strict percentage-of-time approach without regard for the financial impact on the respective parents or the adequacy of support of the child in either household. The analysis set out here is intended to address those concerns. B> Probably the most obvious variation from place to place is when to stop counting. California, Nevada, and Arizona are three community property states sitting right next to one another, and it is not unusual for cases to involve parties with ties to any two of them. All three claim to apply the time rule to pension divisions, but they do the math differently. Where the military member is the custodial parent, there is authority indicating that the member can use the SCRA to stave off change-of-custody or contempt proceedings, even where the non-military parent is thus deprived of contact with the subject child for months, or even years.6 Denial of contact has, however, been deemed important when it is the member making that assertion, requesting a stay of proceedings under the SCRA when the non-military spouse is the child’s custodian.7 The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated the mother did not "impliedly acquiesce in the reduction in support by waiting several years to file a claim," in distinguishing why the father could not use an equitable offset, the Court also advised that there was no express agreement, written or oral, that custody could be changed and the payments reduced. Id. at 662. This implies that if the mother had acquiesced for a period of time or there had been an agreement, the father may have had a viable defense. The case was cited approvingly in Parkinson v. Parkinson, 106 Nev. 481, 796 P.2d 229 (1990). The Court also found the compulsion of circumstances where one parent abandoned the child as a reason for not paying support to be inapplicable. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it determined, without making specific findings of fact, that the parties had joint physical custody and when it modified the custody arrangement set forth in the divorce decree. We therefore reverse and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings, including a new custody determination pursuant to the definition of joint physical custody clarified in this opinion. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that in matters of custody, including visitation, rest in the district court’s sound discretion citing to Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996). The Court further noted that it would not change a district court’s custody determination absent a clear abuse of discretion citing to Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1148, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993). The Court recited the Murphy standard. The Court held that remarriage alone did not establish changed circumstances and that the district court erred in finding changed circumstances on that basis. The Court further held that although a custodial parent’s substantial or pervasive interference with a noncustodial parent’s visitation could give rise to changed circumstances justifying a change in custody, the record in this case did not support a determination that the mother substantially or pervasively interfered with visitation and the district court abused its discretion when it found changed circumstances based upon the mother’s alleged interference with visitation. 1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat d spousable retired pay payable 10 a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as properly of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court. A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding to divide or partition any amount of retired pay of a member as the property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse if a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation (including a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such decree) affecting the member and the member's spouse or former spouse (A) was issued before Ju ne 25,1981, and (B) do not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any amount of retired pay of the member as property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse. Some courts have refused to permit the member to effectively transfer non-reviewable custody to a third party while staying the non-military parent’s access to the courts for child custody.1 In other contexts, courts have been much less sympathetic to arguments based on the parental preference doctrine.2 Both parties appealed on various issues and the Supreme Court reversed in part. The court first reversed the approach of the district court awarding the wife temporary alimony in lieu of her actual share of husband’s pension. The court ruled the approach taken by the district court violated the "equal distribution" rule of NRS 125.150(1)(b) and because an award of alimony is subject to future modification while an award of community property, such as wife’s portion of the pension, is not. In one case I litigated a couple of years ago, the noncustodian spent twice as much each month on cigars as on child support. The trial court was unmoved - since the child support set seven years earlier was already a few dollars above the "presumptive maximum," the court refused to adjust it an iota despite inflation over that period. You can find The Marren and Page Case List Finley v Finley Rivero v Rivero Opinion II B Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four D Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection Child Support Initial Jurisdiction An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section V FERS expert lawyer Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section V Subsection G D Rivero v Rivero IV B Subsection One Las Vegas family law divorce specialist Withdrawal and Borrowing of Money from the TSP After Retirement The Marren and Page Case List Finley v Finley available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. 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